

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

JACK GIBBONS,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CV 116-200
	)	
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE	)	
THE CITY OF WAYNESBORO,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

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**MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

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Plaintiff is proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”) in the above-captioned employment discrimination case. Because Plaintiff’s complaint was filed IFP, it must be screened to protect potential Defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Upon conducting an initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court ordered Plaintiff to amend his complaint within fourteen days to correct certain pleading deficiencies. (See doc. no. 3.) The Court cautioned Plaintiff that failing to submit a timely response would result in a presumption by the Court he desires to have this case voluntarily dismissed and would result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, without prejudice. (Id. at 4-5.) The time to respond has passed, and Plaintiff has not submitted an amended complaint as required by the Court’s December 12, 2016 Order.


A district court has authority to manage its docket to expeditiously resolve cases, and this authority includes the power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to

comply with a court order. Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also Eades v. Ala. Dep't of Human Res., 298 F. App'x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2008) (“District courts possess the ability to dismiss a case . . . for want of prosecution based on two possible sources of authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) or their inherent authority to manage their dockets.”). Moreover, the Local Rules of the Southern District of Georgia dictate that an “assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, *sua sponte* . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice . . . [for] [w]illful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court; or [a]ny other failure to prosecute a civil action with reasonable promptness.” Loc. R. 41.1(c). Finally, dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate pursuant to Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a court order, “especially where the litigant has been forewarned.” Owens v. Pinellas Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 331 F. App'x 654, 655 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)). see also Loc. R. 41.1(b) (Court may dismiss an action *sua sponte* for “willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court”).

Here, Plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint, or even to provide the Court with an explanation for his failure to amend his complaint, amounts not only to a failure to prosecute, but also an abandonment of his case. This is precisely the type of neglect contemplated by the Local Rules. The Court cautioned Plaintiff that a failure to respond would be an election to have his case voluntarily dismissed. Furthermore, because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court finds that the imposition of monetary sanctions is not a feasible sanction.

In sum, the time to respond has passed, and Plaintiff has not submitted an amended complaint as required by the Court's December 12, 2016 Order. Therefore, the Court **REPORTS** and **RECOMMENDS** this case be **DISMISSED** without prejudice and that this civil action be **CLOSED**.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of January, 2017, at Augusta, Georgia.

  
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BRIAN K. EPPS  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA